

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2739

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0311

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 26, 1975
(SALT TWO-748)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 26, 1975.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 26, 1975

ARTICLE IV, PAR. 1, OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975
CONTAINS WORDING AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES WITH REGARD TO THE
MUTUAL OBLIGATION NOT TO START CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL FIXED
LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS. PAR. 2 OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR
THIS ARTICLE SPEAKS OF NOT RELOCATING FIXED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

IN ADDITION, ACCORDING TO ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, AS PROPOSED
BY THE U.S. SIDE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT AN OBLIGATION BE ASSUMED
NOT TO HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME OTHER DELIVERY
VEHICLES "IN EXCESS OF A NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH A NORMAL

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CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE." HAVING STUDIED THIS QUESTION, THE

SOVIET SIDE HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME, IS UNACCEPTABLE. INDEED, IF WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT A "CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE" CANNOT BE VIEWED AS SOMETHING COMPLETELY IMMUTABLE, AND ALSO THAT IT CAN CHANGE DEPENDING UPON THE REAL NEEDS OF EACH SIDE, WHICH ARE ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, ADOPTION OF SUCH A LIMITATION COULD BE USED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES AS A PRETEXT FOR INTERFERENCE IN AREAS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE OTHER SIDE.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, IN ESSENCE, THE SAME SHORT-COMINGS ARE INHERENT TO THE PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, WHICH WERE NOTED IN OUR STATEMENT OF AUGUST 8, 1975 IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROPOSAL, CONTAINED IN THE U.S. WORDING FOR ARTICLE XVIII, SUBPAR. 2(B), TO ASSIGN TO THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION THE FUNCTION OF AGREEING UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR REPLACEMENT AND CONVERSION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE PROPOSAL, UNDER ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, FOR A QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION OF DELIVERY VEHICLES UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME, IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM TO DETERMINE THE COMPOSITION OF SYSTEMS, WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, IS RECORDED IN ARTICLES III AND V OF THE JOINT DRAFT BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE SIDES, AS WELL AS TO THE AGREED PROVISION OF ARTICLE XI OF THE DRAFT ON THE FREEDOM TO CARRY OUT MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS COVERED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, IS ALSO DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS PROPOSED TO ADOPT A SO-CALLED "NORMAL CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE" AS A BASIS OR AS A KIND OF CRITERION FOR THE PROPOSED LIMITATION. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THIS CONCEPT CANNOT BE DESCRIBED IN ANY PRECISE, DEFINITE MANNER. ITS INCLUSION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT AS A CRITERION FOR ONE OF THE OBLIGATIONS COULD ONLY BE A SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE COURSE OF IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED; THIS WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE.

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IN DISCUSSING THE PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT ARTICLE VI OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975 MENTIONS A STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION WHICH, TRULY, HAS A BEARING ON THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE PROVISIONS OF THAT ARTICLE WHICH ARE AGREED OR ARE CLOSE TO BEING AGREED STATE THAT THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, SHALL APPLY

TO THOSE ARMS WHICH ARE IN THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION. THIS ARTICLE CONTAINS A VIRTUALLY AGREED PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF WHEN THE ARMS IN QUESTION ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS BEING IN THAT STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE HAVE HERE ALL THAT IS NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT FOR PRECISELY SPECIFYING THE SCOPE OF OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATIONS ON THOSE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL, BUT WHICH ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, SPECIFICALLY, IN ITS FINAL STAGE. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DEFINITION OF THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS IN FORCE, ENABLES NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH THE OBLIGATION ASSUMED, WITHOUT, IN THE PROCESS, ARTIFICIALLY CREATING ANY KIND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR AMBIGUITY.

THUS, WHEN ONE TYPE OR OTHER OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS REACHES A CLEARLY DISCERNIBLE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION, THE PROBLEM OF COUNTING SUCH ARMS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED WOULD BE SOLVED UNEQUIVOCALLY. AND CONVERSELY, AN OBLIGATION BASED ON CONSISTENCY WITH A SO-CALLED "NORMAL CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE" WOULD CREATE POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPLETELY ARBITRARY INTERPRETATIONS OF MATTERS BEARING DIRECTLY ON THE VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT. AND THIS IS INADMISSIBLE.

FURTHER. THE U.S. SIDE HAS SAID HERE THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, IS INTENDED NOT TO PERMIT A SO-CALLED "BREAKTHROUGH," WHEN WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME A SIDE COULD EXCEED THE 2,400 AGGREGATE. THIS IS A CONTRIVED AND UNREALISTIC SITUATION.

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A GUARANTEE AGAINST SUCH A COURSE OF EVENTS IS PROVIDED PRECISELY BY THE OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE AGGREGATE MAXIMUM LEVELS OF 2,400 AND 1,320 UNITS, BEING ESTABLISHED EQUALLY FOR BOTH SIDES UNDER NEW AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS

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BY THE AGREED PROVISIONS STIPULATING WHEN THE VARIOUS STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN THESE LEVELS. THE RESOLVE OF BOTH SIDES STRICTLY TO OBSERVE THIS FRAMEWORK IN THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A SITUATION ARISING. AS FOR THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV, PAR. 6, THEY WOULD ONLY CAUSE UNNECESSARY AND EVEN UNFORESEEABLE DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS FOR BOTH SIDES. THIS APPLIES IN EQUAL MEASURE TO SLBM LAUNCHERS, AS WELL AS TO HEAVY BOMBERS AND THEIR ARMAMENT.

THE REFERENCE, MADE HERE, TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE IS A PRECEDENT FOR THE ISSUE UNDER CONSIDERATION, IN TERMS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED EITHER. THE CORRESPONDING PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF JULY 3, 1974 APPLIES TO ONE SPECIFIC TYPE OF ARMS, IN THIS CASE TO REPLACEMENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES. THIS WAS A DECISION AGREED UPON FOR THE TERM OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH REFLECTS SECRET

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THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOL THERETO.

BUT NOW WE ARE SPEAKING OF SOMETHING ELSE--OF AN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL THE END OF 1985, WHICH WILL

COVER SEVERAL TYPES OF ARMS, NO LESS; MOREOVER, EACH SIDE WILL BE FREE TO DETERMINE THEIR COMPOSITION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREED AGGREGATE CEILINGS, BEARING IN MIND THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, WHICH PRESUPPOSES THE POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF REPLACEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN THE NEW AGREEMENT IT WOULD BE WRONG BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND IN METHODOLOGY, MECHANICALLY TO CARRY OVER PARTICULAR DECISIONS SET DOWN BY THE SCC PROCEDURES, WHICH WERE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHEN ONE KIND OF REPLACEMENT WAS BEING GOVERNED. SUCH A CARRY-OVER WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO CONTRADICTIONS WITH THE PROVISIONS, AGREED BY THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE FREEDOM TO DETERMINE COMPOSITION AND THE RIGHT OF THE SIDES TO MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REJECT THE PROPOSAL ON A QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME. THE CONSTRUCTION, MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT SCHEDULE OF ANY OF THE SYSTEMS WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED IS THE BUSINESS OF EACH SIDE.

MR. AMBASSADOR, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE, AS WELL AS THE ROLE, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROVISIONS BEING WORKED OUT FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT, OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATIONS ON FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO STATE THAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER INCLUDING IN THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT A PROVISION ON BANNING RELOCATION OF FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS. AT THE SAME TIME, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT, MENTIONED TODAY, ARE INTERNALLY INTERRELATED, WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE, WITH RESPECT TO THEM, AT CONSTRUCTIVE DECISIONS ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

MR. AMBASSADOR,
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AT THE MEETING OF AUGUST 19, 1975 THE USSR DELEGATION TABLED A NEW PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE XII OF THE DRAFT, PERTAINING TO THE TIME FRAME AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SIDES WOULD BRING INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE AGGREGATE MAXIMUM LEVELS BEING ESTABLISHED THOSE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AT THEIR DISPOSAL, WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE NEW AGREEMENT; IT ALSO DEALS WITH THE QUESTION OF DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS PROHIBITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XII TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE IN GENEVA AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE USSR PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE III, PAR. 1, WHICH DEALS WITH THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES TO LIMIT DELIVERY VEHICLES TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 2,400, MAKES IT POSSIBLE, WE ARE CONVINCED, TO AGREE ON CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF AUGUST 22, 1975, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS CERTAIN ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CONTENT OF THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE FOR ARTICLE XII.

MENTION WAS MADE HERE OF THE TIME OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE MAXIMUM LEVELS--2,400 AND 1,320 UNITS--BEING ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE SIDES HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION, WHICH IS PRECISELY RECORDED IN THE DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING THE RESULT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK--THE JOINT SOVIET-U.S. STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 24 AND THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974. BOTH THESE DOCUMENTS SPECIFY MOST DEFINITELY THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL COVER THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 1977 TO DECEMBER 31, 1985.

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THE FORMULATION CONTAINED IN THE SOVIET VERSION OF ARTICLE XX, PAR. 1, OF THE JOINT DOCUMENT OF MAY 7, 1975 REFLECTS THIS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES.

IT FOLLOWS THEREFROM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVELS OF 2,400 AND 1,320 TO BE ESTABLISHED, AS OF OCTOBER 3, 1977 NEITHER SIDE WILL BE ENTITLED TO MAKE OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED LIMITS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT ALSO INSUES FROM THE TEXTS OF THE JOINT SOVIET-U.S. STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 24 AND THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972 WILL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL OCTOBER 1977.

WHEN THE LIMITATIONS ON THE AGGREGATE QUANTITATIVE LEVELS ENTER INTO FORCE, THE SIDES MIGHT HAVE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE LEVEL OF 2,400 UNITS BEING ESTABLISHED. IN LINE WITH THE SUBSTANCE AND LOGIC OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL
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FOR ARTICLE XII, SUCH WEAPONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION WITHIN 12 MONTHS AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THUS, WE ARE NOT AT ALL SPEAKING OF POSTPONING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE 2,400 AGGREGATE NUMBER BEING ESTABLISHED, AS WAS SAID IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 22, 1975; ON THE CONTRARY, WE ARE SPEAKING OF BRINGING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES INTO STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE ESTABLISHED LIMITATIONS WITHIN 12 MONTHS AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND OF THE DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION OF THOSE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH THE SIDES MIGHT HAVE IN EXCESS OF THE ESTABLISHED LEVEL OR WHICH WOULD BE PROHIBITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF ARMS WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION IS ALSO MENTIONED IN THE U.S. WORDING FOR ARTICLE XII THAT DEALS WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS "WHICH WOULD BE" IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED BY THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED. THIS IS A REALISTIC APPROACH, AND OUR PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 19, 1975 CONTAINS THE FORMULA USED BY THE U.S. SIDE.

THUS, THE NEW USSR PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XII NOT ONLY DOES NOT RUN COUNTER TO THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, BUT ON THE CONTRARY, COMPLETELY

FOLLOWS THAT UNDERSTANDING AND EMBODIES IT IN A CONSISTENT MANNER.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE, DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF ARMS WHICH WOULD BE IN EXCESS OF THE NUMBERS BEING ESTABLISHED OR WHICH WOULD BE PROHIBITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT MUST BE COMPLETED WITHIN A SPECIFICALLY STATED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, I.E. AFTER OCTOBER 1977. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE 12-MONTH PERIOD PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, DURING WHICH THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY WITH THE LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED FOR THEM BY THE NEW AGREEMENT, TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME IS NECESSARY FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S. SIDE, AS WELL, AND IS ALSO SHOWN BY THE EXPERIENCE OF IMPLEMENTING SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY IN FORCE.

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THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE XII CONTAINS A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE SIDES TO A QUITE DEFINITE PARTICULAR PROBLEM WHICH BEARS ON ENSURING THE VIABILITY AND STABILITY OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT. THE PROPOSED WORDING CONSTITUTES A GOOD BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE JOINT DRAFT. JOHNSON

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